"Missing Persons... (and the ethics of affective eventhood)"

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This is not a book review, although at certain moments it might seem to rehearse that role and serve some aspects at least of that function. It takes the Pearson and Shanks *Theatre/Archaeology* (Routledge 2001) not so much as its starting-point - since my own deliberations here date from the mid-1980s and were grounded in my performance-focused suspicions of the "textual turn"[1] of that era - as the site of an enquiry into certain instances of interdisciplinary writing, viewed as a major outcome of an historically-specific 'knowledge-political' project in the university.

I want to identify this project and the principles as well as the analytical mechanisms accruing to it, as participating in an *interdisciplinary turn*, along the lines of but subordinate to both the "textual turn" and the "practice turn" which have been identified by other writers looking back, with some curiosity, at some of the activities (and modes of writing-production) of the last three or more decades of the 20thC, in the European and US university. I shall argue that the *inter*-disciplinary project produces certain sorts of observations, recorded generally in writing according to certain sorts of disciplinary registers and text-patterns, in order to ask whether writing itself, as practice, however *principled* its practitioners, serves the disciplinary arts of performance-making as well as it serves "interpretive archaeology". I view the latter, in so doing, from a position of non-expertise, but wonder, as I proceed, as to the nature of and the apparatuses and intelligibility-frames employed within, this particular activity. In this sense, my enquiry is interested in the power and authority of certain expert registers of writing, in relation to what are otherwise heterogenous 'knowledge objects' and 'knowledge practices'[2]

Theatre/Archaeology is to be welcomed for the fine and copious detail it provides with regard to the performance-making of Brith Gof, in terms widely accessible to students of Performance Studies (a curious quasi-discipline in British and American universities whose popularity has grown exponentially over recent decades). But the

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[1] Typical is H. Foster, *The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century,,* MIT Press: Cambridge and London, 1996

[2] My reference here is to "epistemic objects" as K. Knorr Cetina uses the term, in T. Shatzki et al (eds) *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, Routledge: London and New York, 2001

text's announced agenda is more far-reaching, and I shall argue that where the text leaves Brith Gof in search of wider interdisciplinary implications, it demonstrates some of the curious consequences of late 20thC Performance Studies erasures and omissions. Because Performance Studies as institutional setup in a knowledge economy has more generally authorised these erasures and omissions, in terms of the agendae it set for itself in the university in the final decades of the 20thC, my argument here is that the Pearson/Shanks undertaking is not their source, but that their explicitly interdisciplinary enquiry exacerbates an already problematic situation. In my view the latter is significant enough in implication to mean that the vibrant dialogue staged by these two expert practitioners is on curiously slippery ground (to take up a metaphor appropriate to their project). Whether or not it undermines their interdisciplinary project, is for others to decide.

1. *Missing Persons...*

What is the place of the person of the professional within the profession or discipline? Are there differences to be identified, in this regard, between different disciplines? I have intimated that something is missing from the Pearson/Shanks collaboration, suggesting, in addition, that it is also largely missing from the writing of Performance Studies itself, in the final decades of the 20thC. Many (if not certain generations of undergraduates) will recall that apparently seminal moment, in those final decades of the 20thC, when the author, according to then popular metaphoric formulation, *died*, opening spaces, as 'he' did so, for cultural systems to provide suitable place-fillers. In that context, intertextuality had a particular role to play, and the prefix, 'inter-', assumed a particularly energetic role.

That metaphoric death, seen now from the early years of the 21stC, '*is history*' (even if it goes on being rehearsed in seminar rooms across the land), by which I mean that this particular strategy had its precise moment and its site of emergence, as well as its place in a broader and further-reaching 'knowledge-political' agenda. This is not the place to review in detail the contexts of emergence of notorious observations of that kind, but others have begun to do so - as though surviving the end and the turn of the millennium provides the pretext for some of us to review the activities often seen as

clustering around 'the events' of May 1968[3].

Two key writers looking back at some of the curious activities of the later 20thC - the art-critical writer, Hal Foster and the "professional philosopher, Peter Osborne[4] - have dwelt to different degrees on the "textual" or discursivist "turns" of those post-WWII decades in Europe and the US. Both observe the proliferation of what Osborne describes as a post-Saussurean "semiological rearticulation" of what I have called "mixed-mode" cultural artefacts or events. In Osborne's 'millennial' enquiry into "Sign and Image", he notes that "As a field",

> cultural studies distinguished itself from previous disciplinary approaches to contemporary culture by its concern for the role of meanings in the social organization of power. Initially, this concern took two main forms: an extension of the field of relevant objects and practices to totality (the democratic dimension of the anthropological move) and the deployment of the concept of ideology, to identify the political functions of the various objects and practices under consideration. (23)

"What began", Osborne argues, "as an uneven articulation of different disciplinary approaches to the social study of meaning", took two paths, both of which were historically-specific: the first was the emergence of "a unitary transdiciplinary theoretical medium - textuality"; the second was the further development of a post-Kantian "divorce" of the "theorization of the formal sensible qualities" of the art-object or event, "from its representational function" (21). In the continuation of the post-Saussurean project, Osborne argues, following and perpetuating the implications of this schism, semiology "has come, increasingly, to treat ...signifying function[s] in abstraction from both...sensible and... existential qualities", whilst the actual historical bases for that development "remain unreflected in the theoretical constitution" of the fields of

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[3] I tend to prefer to approach the theoretical writing as 'post-WWII', with particular reference to the French experience of German occupation, and its aftermath.

[4] P. Osborne, *Philosophy in Cultural Theory*, Routledge:London and New York, 2000

"*signification* and *aesthesis*".

Performance Studies has tended, in the final decades of the 20thC, to prefer questions of representation, to questions concerned with the formal, sensible, the event-compositional and the existential in performance-making and its events. Performance Studies has almost joyfully embraced the role and responsibility of "semiological rearticulation" - in writing, on the basis of a quite limited range of interpretative apparatuses - of complex multi-modal and heterogenous practices, almost as though convinced that this role were required of it, by and within the university - which Michel de Certeau once described as a major institution within the scriptural economy[5].

The emergence of "a unitary transdiciplinary theoretical medium - textuality" has facilitated, in turn, the Pearson/Shanks *Theatre /Archaeological* project, privileging writing as the apparently 'natural' meeting-point between different disciplines, despite the fact of the curious history Osborne identifies, as well as the point that I should want to make here, which is that writing is far enough from being a natural act to cause many expert performance-makers considerable ***dis***-ease in contemplating it and what it requires of its users. It is a university-preferred, dominant register of practice, to be sure, but let's reflect on Osborne's point as to the historical emergence of that preference, and on its implications for those for whom mixed-mode performance-making practices and events are the professional preference.

Peter Osborne, as "professional philosopher", by which he simply understands a disciplinary writer having authorised access to "the historically developed and institutionally structured space of philosophical positions and possibilities" (86), seems to me to be highly perceptive in his observation that semiological rearticulations, preoccupied with and thematizing representation, have developed, in the university, "in abstraction from [a concern with] both...sensible and... existential qualities", in the cultural practices concerned. I want to underline this question of the "*sensible and existential*" at this point, with regard to the late 20thC professional performance-making

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[5] M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans S. Rendall, Universityof California Press, Berkley and London, 1984.

practices of Mike Pearson, before pursuing Osborne's reflections, in the same text, as to the outcome of an interdisciplinarity which takes the textual, in post-Saussurean terms, as the model upon which all other human practices can be investigated.

"The power of the Saussurean paradigm", Osborne notes, for academic researcher-writers across disciplinary barriers,"derives from its combination of simplicity and generality". But what equally needs to be observed in its widespread uptake, is its indifference to "the specificities of signifying materials" (22) subjected to its processing. That indifference "had the effect of creating ...a new trans- or anti-disciplinary object, the text" as the preferred site for "semiological rearticulations" calculated upon a particular theory of the subject. "[S]ubsequent accretions", Osborne goes on, using what is in the present context a pleasingly appropriate metaphor, "such as a Derridean conception of difference or a deconstructive notion of performativity, represents refinements...to the evolution of the model" (23), rather than innovation.

Let's return, at this point, to the abstracted *sensible and existential* qualities not so much of performance-making to externally-ratified professional criteria, but of the investment of the named practitioner in these. Let's add, on the other side of the equation, the observations with regard to the "combination of simplicity and generality" of the textualist model, plus the assertion of the latter's indifference to "the specificities of signifying materials", but proceed to modify the final term to include "aesthetic practices". It is within this complex framework that I suggest that we return to the declared aspirations of the writers of *Theatre/Archaeology*, in an attempt to review these in the light of Osborne's 'millennial' observations. Indicatively, Pearson and Shanks identify the object of their dialogue and their project more generally in these sorts of terms:

> ...we hope that we have begun to make clear that we stress the deeper structural features of our common project: an interdisciplinary and hybrid focus on the textures of social and cultural experience; the means and materials of forging cultural ecologies or milieux which attend to that contemporary tension between the global and the local; how we model the event of this cultural production, the weaving of connections through such indeterminate times and places.

I am intrigued, myself, re-reading this, by two aspects which seem to me to involve a degree of investigative fossicking plus a degree of invention: the first concerns what I take to be the inadequacies of writing more generally, in what are explicitly expert or technical or explanatory registers[6] wherever metaphor dominates that writing - as though that metaphoric usage might clarify something for a reader.

I confess that although I *sense* what is meant by the term "deeper structural features" (and such uses are widespread, rather than specific to these particular writers), I am at a loss when it comes to demonstration of instances of these or even of the mechanisms involved in their identification. I am supposing, meanwhile, that the literal meaning of "deep" might be important to archaeologists. (I have similar, long-established difficulties with the application of the qualifier "deep" when reference is to the psyche, for the simple reason that these are abstractions within explanatory myths[7] masquerading as technical terms. I have never been able, in 'excavatory' terms, to take onboard the implications of that sort of spatializing trope, nor the formula according to which I might 'have' a conscious, a *sub*-conscious and an *un*-conscious. My question as to *where these might be* located is treated, reasonably enough, as trouble-making - even perverse.)

The second concerns more aspects of that *sensing* I mention above, and the difficulties sensing seems to produce for the critical-analytical. I had initially written something like the following:*"w*hat seems to me to be strongly conveyed in this short quote, on the other hand, through quite specific linguistic and discursive choices ("hope that we"; "have begun to make clear"; "that we stress" – the instances are numerous) are those abstractions - ethos, attitude, shared agenda and work project; care, attention, investment, commitment – which as readers many of us tend to *sense* in an engagement with a text, rather than to decipher as those these were conventional aspects of 'meaning'".

I am intrigued, re-reading both the extract quoted and my own response to it, by the apparently effortless *production* these little discursive markers (indices or symptoms

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[6] G.Ulmer, *Teletheory: Grammatology in the Age of Video*, Routledge:London and New York, 1989

[7] ibid

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or pointers, in late 19thC Peircian semiotics) have triggered in me. I am intrigued by the ways in which these have seemed so smoothly to cause me to produce, and to animate, within my invented 'possible world', qualities which I attribute to the writers' investment, attitude, ethos, political engagement and even their apparent dialogue (which, in the 21stC, is likely in part to have been conducted at a distance and by e-mail attachment).

What are the implications of my engagement and scenario-productive invention - which goes so far as to include the writers as person, having, by popular accord, certain sorts of feelings, intent, objectives, and so on - for "interpretive archaeology"? Surely these discursive particles and the constellation I have produced from them, do not authorize the liberties I have taken - except *to the extent that I work in/with performance-making?* What liberties of this sort might the "interpretive archaeologist" be allowed or allow herself? Curiously, one of the meeting-points of the two academic practitioners (Pearson/Shanks) seems to have been the *sense* that both disciplines (performance-making and archaeological 'world' (*re-*)constitution), involve dramaturgy and mise en scene. I do not know the answer to my question as to "interpretive archaeology's" licence to rehearse informed invention, nor am I aware of the mechanisms involved in the archaeological, its *techne*. I don't have to guess, on the other hand, that the performance specialist is licensed to invent *persons*, the personal - indeed, the exemplary, the exceptional, and the singular.

Why this observation here? Because - despite her aspiration to the 'scientific'- the performance-professional practitioner is not, actually, a poet of the general or pedestrian (however much some of the former like to make that once fashionable claim). Instead, if she is to live from it, *she is a poet of affective eventhood,* whether in a minor or a major key. The archaeologist, at least in my imaginings, faced by similar traces, is licensed to invent *the general*, and not the exceptional. Hence the concern of my title - confronted as it is with the aspirations of the *interdisciplinary turn* - with missing *persons*, who are professionals, and sign their work as such, in the performance-making sense.

I return to the rhetorical strategy involved in these sorts of inventions, in the third

part of this paper, under the heading of "hypotyposis"[8]

What then might be missing from this interdisciplinary project, if I return to Osborne's observations with regard to the sensible and the existential? I am looking in the writing, as I read, for (sensible, existential) traces of the qualities I have considered to be specific, in my wider experience, to the person of the *career* performance-practitioner (if I might be so crude), in the professional. Mike Pearson, who took up his current position as academic writer and educator relatively recently, has a longer history as a performance-professional practitioner, whose own performance work was not simply widely respected but - if I can generalise - characterised by both its explicit disciplinary mastery and affective intensity, as well as performance-political and regional implications, and more general concerns with site, activity, and identity.

I need to stress this matter of *highly-individualized* disciplinary mastery at this point, adding two further observations: the first is that his professional performance-making needs to be identified in terms of *signature*, as exemplary and as affirmative (in terms of its performance register) in the sense Brian Massumi[9] gives to the terms. My second observation is that his performance-making - his performance *aesthetic* - might also need to be approached in terms of an *ethics of affective eventhood*, hence as teleoaffective in its calculation and execution[10].

By the latter, I mean that its compositional choices, its existential pragmatic investment and its *aesthetic,* are both signed (and marketable/marketed as such), *and* they were guided by, and targeted, certain sorts of affective investment and outcome for the different participants in its event/s. That the work was also regulated by performance-professional production logics, involving remarkable skills in collaborative production, and by wholly professional production values, and that it operated through

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[8] hypotyposis,in Paul de Man, is given as making "present, to the senses, something which is out of their reach, not just because it does not happen to be there but because it consists, in whole or in part, of elements too abstract for sensory representation." (P. de Man, in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[9] B. Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2001.

[10] T. Shatzki *et al* (eds), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, Routledge: London and New York, 2001

highly sophisticated frames of performance intelligibility, might also need to be added. In other words, that work was both obedient to certain institutional setups (in whose terms it was professionally recognisable, and fundable), and it aimed at singularity, at exemplarity. This is not an unusual combination, in the profession, even though that same combination renders the dominant discourses of Performance Studies constitutively ambiguous.

What are the implications of these sorts of observations for the interdisciplinary dialogue and larger project attempted by these two writers? I want to turn at this point to indicative fragments from Michael Shanks' poetic account of the history of the archaeologist at work, asking, not wholly frivolously, whether the archaeologist thereby described might have been a likely candidate for collaboration in the intense multi-participant event of site specific performance production, and what sort of role in that she might have wanted, performance-untrained as she was, to take on:

> Archaeologists walk the land, observing, recording, drawing, telling...(37)
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> Landscape is a nexus of inhabitation, place and value. ... It should not be forgotten that the roots of the term still lie in the notion of an aesthetic cultivation of the view or aspect... This submission of place to reason and imagination imbricates time and history.(39)
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> The equation between people, their culture and the land they inhabit is central to the time-space systematics of the discipline of archaeology...(37)

The archaeologist, in these brief details, is not only a solitary practitioner, but her professional-existential subject position is worked in terms of place, landscape, and culture, observing, recording, drawing and telling. Her name and signature are not a matter of public display and public ownership.. Her 'knowledge-object', and her epistemic practices, are not only unfolded gently and by a single hand, in time and place, but do not include affective eventhood of particular intensity. Her face is better unknown than recognized; she is not, thus, like Solon, the first theorist[11], whose public and processional performance of his verbal accounts of distant places and oracles visited is made with due pomp and ceremony, with professional ostentation and the performance of

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[11] both G. Ulmer, *Heuretics: The Logic of Invention*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994, and J. Rabate, *The Future of Theory,* Blackwell Publishers:Oxford, 2002 recount the

authority. Nor does her work seek to be other than (nor to aspire to anything other than) generalising on the basis of the particular, whereas Mike Pearson's work has aimed, despite the modesty of his professing, to be exactly the opposite.

2. *Spectator Studies in the university*

I want to pursue some of the observations emerging from my contrary position on the margins of writing, above, in order to attempt to reach the fuller array of dominant discourses in Performance Studies in the university. My enquiry here, of which I can include only a few details, is driven by my observation that much of what has been researched, taught and published, under the heading of Performance Studies in the university, belongs actually to a Spectator Studies in masquerade; that the relational positioning of expert spectating, in the performance event, together with that spectator's modes of engagement and writing-production - or semiological rearticulation in Performance Studies registers - *after* the event, better match the activities and modes of engagement of the "interpretive archaeologist", as these are set out in *Theatre/ Archaeology*, than they do those of the professional performance-maker. The relatively recent focus on theatre as a visual art, in one typical example, tends to forget that because the performer cannot see either herself or indeed the rest of the team/design *in the work*, and that that sight, besides, is rarely relevant to what she is doing, the qualifier 'visual' is a curious one. My argument is that a supposedly 'visual' theatre is, then, spectator-calculated and described, described from the positions of spectating.

There are historical and demographic bases, as others have pointed out, for the widening participation of expert spectators in Performance Studies in the university. Peter Osborne has noted that the entry of a post-WWII generation of artists into the university in the US, in the 1960s, lent its weight to the development of a conceptual art for which discursivity played a more central role than did aesthetic tradition. The deconstruction of the canon continued in the same era which saw the development of

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processional aspect of the etymology of "theory", overlooked, according to Rabate, by successive philosophers and also overlooked, indeed, in widespread current usage (both technical and commonsensical) of the term.

Performance Studies as a discipline, and the popular, anti-institutional appeal of critical theory - described by Hal Foster as the continuation of modernism by stealth - has tended to dominate activities and ways of seeing in the swelling Performance Studies cohort who were not subjected to audition, at point of entry onto the programme.

The potential required at point of entry was almost by definition *not* performance-professional; indeed, it tended, rather, in the direction of a writerly, spectatorial competence, and to justify that selection process on the basis of then fashionable cultural studies and critical-theoretical discourses and apparatuses. That the programmes welcomed performance skills where they could be found - sometimes as though by accident - seems to me to have interesting implications for benchmarking, but not for advanced performance-making.. But what should we make, today, of a Spectator Studies in the university, informed by the projects of critical theory, which nonetheless *does not speak its name*?

Certain elements have begun to emerge above, from my contrary look from the margins at others' discourses and practices, which should have clear implications for the Pearson/Shanks project; they reveal some aspects of what I have identified as a constitutive ambiguity not simply within the interdisciplinary project outlined, but within the dominant discourses and apparatuses of Performance Studies, where these have been pursued via conceptual models and modes of attack made available by later 20thC cultural theory of the European kind. (I was myself trained, as performance analyst, in precisely these cultural theoretical discourses, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in connection with theatrical practices.)

When I declare, then, that Performance Studies has long been attracted by the precise opposite of performance-professional disciplinary mastery, I need to confess my own earlier attraction to, for example, the writing of de Certeau on a pedestrian poetics and an 'aesthetics of making-do', as well as to the notion that there is no outside to performance. Patently, if there is no outside to performance, then the professional archaeologist, in turn, is a performer. (I have remarked, elsewhere, however[12], that this might be valid, *in theory*, but that I should nonetheless not want to pay ticket prices to see

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[12] see for example S. Melrose, "please adjust your set", http://www.sfmelrose.u-net.com

her do it.)

If I might continue to be crudely reductive, I would typify the orientations and engagements, of Spectator Studies in the university, as having tended toward issues of representation, rather than to those specific to performance institutions, performance aesthetics, performer professions, virtuosity, *talent*, and training. I would argue that they have tended to adopt a post-Ricoeurian hermeneutics of suspicion, in their uptake of certain "critical-theoretical" premises and modes of engagement, despite their frequent failure to distinguish meaningfully between the different roles, responsibilities, modes of intervention and knowledge-positions, of director or choreographer, performer, production-professional and spectator. But I am rather weary of having to reassert that some of the notions taken for granted in Spectator Studies' focus on representation are based on commonsensical notions, inadequate to the analytical task at hand: dramatic 'character', for example, in performance, is a complex trope, hence neither a person (although drawing on the actor's person) nor likely to achieve empirical fit with a spectator's sense of personhood, unless and until the latter plays her own productive role in that process of excavation, recognition, production and (re-)constitution.

I have noted that the latter is worked through the ancient rhetorical function of hypotyposis; that the production work involved is both that of actor/performer *and* - because the latter never sees the show from where spectators see it - *other to* that actor/performer's professional mastery and peculiar state of 'insider-knowledge'.

I do recognise, however, the interest to the social sciences of the "practice turn", and their impact of their own interest, in the later 20thC, in performances in/as everyday life, as well as the role these have played in Performance Studies as it is pursued in different university departments. I want to add that university-based performance students lack, indeed, more than any other mode of published material, professional performance-practitioner accounts which take onboard the later 20thC cultural-theoretical assemblage and its writing-productive appratuses. Let's make no mistake about this: Mike Pearson's expert account of the work of Brith Gof is that of a professional practitioner. I should want to go so far as to add however that it is the account of a disciplinary master, reviewed from within and thereafter regulated by another disciplinary context - but perhaps I have already made that claim strongly enough.

3. *'World'-conjuring*

As historically specific performance-*writing*, some of this text's performance-studies insights will survive time passing, and seem to triumph over issues of context, situation, institutional setup, and... 'knowledge-politics'. Their value in terms of a number of different areas of enquiry is clear, and this will continue to be an invaluable account of Brith Gof's later 20thC work. It will continue to be appraised in terms of particular readers' own disciplinary specialism and interests, not least because of the paucity of published material on site-specific performance practice, written from a professional-practitioner knowledge-position.

The omissions, erasures and constitutive ambiguities which emerge when the vast and unwieldy agenda of Performance Studies is laid over the text in question are only 'decipherable' when a reader brings to the interdisciplinary task announced and celebrated by the writers, an independent and perhaps a *contrary* grasp of performance-professional and creative-industry institutional setups in the UK and elsewhere, early in the 21stC. That so many of the discourses identified above have thematized 'practice', from within expert and institutionally-obedient, 'authorised and authoritative' registers of writing, has encouraged some of us to imagine that we might co-opt those discourses for use in terms of our own approaches to performance practice. My earlier point about those disciplinary discourses, however, is that they tend to be written from the perspective of the expert *observer of* practices (akin, in this, to the expert-spectator but not to the expert arts practitioner); not only this, but that they tend to be able to make *anything at all* interesting in academic terms (at least to academics) without the slightest regard for the aesthetics of the objectified activity itself.

The sociologist and critical-ethnographer, for all that he or she may have become attentive to their own compositional role in disciplinary writing, tend still to observe and write from an experrt-spectator-like position and *apparent* distance from their 'knowledge object'. Hence the'ground-plan' - because I am concerned with the schematics of disciplinary enquiry (as well as the site of arts-disciplinary practices) - tends, if we shift into the multidimensional schematics of the performance event, to replicate the position and relational engagement of the expert spectator, and of her own

discipline of Spectator Studies. Typical of the expert spectator's attempt to define 'performance' is Jon McKenzie's recently published *Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance* (Routledge 2001) which takes up a major Deleuzian trope. McKenzie thereby conceives of performances past in terms of what I would judge to be, from a performance professional perspective, a dehumanized and anonymizing "stratification":

> [which] proceeds through a double process which consists of 1) the sedimentation or layering of flows and submolecular elementsinto molecular forms, and 2) the folding or compounding of these forms into molar compounds and functions. (174)

Working a second time with numbered and layered processes, he suggests that "there are strata within strata within strata" - not an unreasonable observation if one's background is Deleuzian, and if one's landscape is unpeopled in general and de-professionalised in particular. From this point of view, "the earth" would have

> thickened into three general belts of strata: geological, biological, and anthropomorphic or, respectively, the inorganic, the organic, and the human.

According to McKenzie, in his attempt at generalisation, then, "*our* general theory of performance unfolds on this third stratum, for it is here that performance must first be situated" (175: my emphasis). This "general theory of performance" is however expert spectator-positioned, and belongs in Spectator Studies; its consequence is that performance practices, along with "the practitioner", slip obediently into the field of the *other* of the subject (of analysis). The practitioner-object (of analysis), not unaccustomed to abjection, takes up that place repeatedly given her by Spectator Studies. Yet this very *positioning* (surely important to a spatialiser?) goes unmentioned by the writer himself; and it will remain unidentified as such, as long as McKenzie is able to take that authoritative lead from critical and cultural theory of the later 20thC. He therein remains amply and generously supported. It is, in more general terms, the interdisciplinary aspiration that supports his and others' approaches to the curious notion of a generalised performance. Let's not forget that in Osborne's terms (above) the *textualization* of heterogeneous modes of practice in the further expansion of a post-Saussurean

semiology, "cannot avoid some kind of ontologization of ...semantic formalism - some recourse to discourse about being" (23), even where the approach claims to be concerned with - for example - the 'specificities' of the complex practices concerned.   In McKenzie, despite the interest of his writing, the 'deleuzianisation' of his ways of seeing performance bring with them an apparatus which *(re-)*produces itself upon its object, effectively transforming it.

The discoveries recorded in *Theatre/Archaeology* seem to spring forth from a vivid and often powerful writing. That writing - if we look at it from its margins - needs to be viewed less as descriptive than 'world-constituting'. *In other words* (as I write so easily) it frequently adopts constructive/constitutive devices such as *hypotyposis*. You might recall that hypotyposis, in one notorious late 1970s account, was described as a *figuration*

> which makes present, to the senses, something which is out of their reach, not just because it does not happen to be there but because it consists, in whole or in part, of elements too abstract for sensory representation. (P. de Man, in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, University of Chicago Press, 1979).

Hypotyposis refers, tradition has it, to a vivid sketch (for example, in writing, or in drawing- or perhaps, equally, in the excavated) which enables its reader or viewer to seem to (*re-*)constitute an identifiable world of complex practices, actions, events, sites, revelations, and, arguably (although this is surely stretching a point) *feelings*. It is, by definition, partial, dependent upon expert positioning and authoritative interpretation.

I have supposed that the professional performance practitioner is an expert and inventive 'world-maker', a complex process which necessarily engages, within the economy of performance practices, the 'creative' intervention of a spectator. Where the performance professional's intervention is '*imagined*-world-constituting', the spectator's 'creative' engagement is reactive, to materials and modes produced by the performance makers, rather than professionally-inventive. (Hence my urge to refute some of the later 1980s *post*-reception studies excesses with regard to a supposedly equal creative engagement by the spectator.)

In my own research hypotyposis has largely been passed on within literary studies, as a language-based device. I am rather more interested in its uses in mixed-mode art practices, where its operations can be identified as constitutive of and within the performative economy of art-making practices. From this perspective, I am curious as to the potential uptake of hypotyposis in "interpretive archaeology". But let's look at two examples of more conventional usage, in order to see whether that analogy might hold: in dramatic writing and staging, the spoken account of Cleopatra, given by the playwright to the character of Enobarbus, has long seemed to enable listeners (including theatre-makers and other disciplinary practitioners) to conjure up not simply a greater and more detailed image of an exotic queen than is contained in the words themselves, but also a situation, the participants and activities which collocate with it, together with a *sense* of atmosphere, of reverent and directed attitude, even a sense of glory. The whole is liable, on that basis, to inform stagings as well as spectators' grasp of these - at which point, however, further instances of hypotyposis, within the performance economy which applies, will also be at work.

A second example from film-making and narrative-construction might be useful here: use of the zoom lens in filming Robert de Niro in *The Deerhunter*[13] punctuates a long midshot on the actor in an anonymous room. The 'vivid sketch' here is provided by the combination of midshot and zoom in to a section of the actor's face and eyes; both midshot and zoom shot are held, in turn, long enough for spectators to *produce*, from their combination in time, a considerable body of (psychologising) material which, firstly, must 'fit' schematically with the explanatory patterns already set up in the film; and secondly which the filmmakers have no need, then, to provide - despite the fact that this considerable body of material is vital to the effective development of the narrative.

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[13] directed by Michael Cimino, 1978 (US) and starring Robert De Niro and Christopher Walken.

I am supposing that the operations of hypotyposis may well seem to be *sensed* by a spectator, despite the evidence of the film-makers' highly economical control, and that stress tends to be laid in mainstream film uses on the outcome of the strategy (in narrative terms) rather than its mechanics. The device, in other words, is not used as critical metapractice, in this cultural product. Let's not however mistake effects - produced in spectators - for causes, specific to practitioner uses of film technology. The film-*maker*, by way of contrast with the spectator's engagement, must be able to instruct other expert practitioners in wholly technical terms, hence has mastered an expert-technical metalanguage. The zoom-in on the actor's face and eyes causes me, at least, to shift from situational and contextual information specific to the narrative, to intense psychologisation of character. None of this productive work, on my part, by the way, requires the intervention of discourse. I seem to *sense* these narrative complexities, and had to view the material a second time in order to review what had actually happened in terms of the film-making technical strategy. My supposition is that this is because the interpretative appratuses involved are effectively internalised, by late 20thC viewers.

In this typical instance, then, the operation of hypotyposis is visual at source, *for the viewer,* but its effects derive from naturalised psychological explanatory myth. It is historically-specific, facilitated by a particular state of film technology; and in this specific disciplinary equation (film production), the work of the actor comes last. Hypotyposis plays, in other words, a determining role here, but it is one which might well be widely misrecognized by spectators, in terms of the narrative economy of film. I wonder, at this point, from my position as outright amateur, whether hypotyposis is similarly vital to "interpretive arachaeology", engaged however not by the artist, but by some more abstract force (e.g. 'history').

I am taking the liberty here, as a complete non-specialist, of supposing that for some "interpretive archaeologists", what is excavated or uncovered at a particular site might well serve similarly, once appropriately (*re-*)configured, as something like a vivid, material object-based sketch which seems to invite a professional's engagement; might serve, when the appropriate disciplinary frames and interpretative apparatuses are brought by experts to the task, as a recognisable component within a familiar pattern.

That pattern or pattern-making-potential, at a further remove, might enable the *"*interpretive archaeologist", in particular, to engage in something like a complex dramaturgy and mise en scene - neither of which, by the way, is nor entails a discursive practice. Both dramaturgy and mise en scene, certainly, require *disciplinary* mastery if employed in public performance-making; but what degree of mastery of dramaturgy ormise en scene applies, in the case of the archaeologist's professional invention?

My supposition is that such a pattern recognized, from the point of view of my inexpert take on the *archaeological turn*, might seem to allow the specialist to invest the artefacts concerned with a presence, "to the senses, [of] something which is out of their reach, not just because it does not happen to be there but because it consists, in whole or in part, of elements too abstract for sensory representation". I am plainly traducing that ancient art of hypotyposis here, but my simpler suggestion, if you have a training in semiology, semiotics, or schematics, is that the configuration would seem,

i.   at first remove, to be multi-dimensional, semiotically-constituted and precise (identification of significant unitary components and potential patterning);

ii.   at second remove, to be schematically-expanded (3-D patterns identified/constituted through interpreter recourse to already-familiar 'external' patterns);

iii.   and at third remove, in a conjuring grounded in something like a *sensed* sub-semiotic, heterogeneous particles, dispersed within and across a site (whether archaeological or textual or choreographic and spectatorial), to be dependent upon an interpreter's investment and 'creative' invention; to bring into play "something which is out of ... reach, not just because it does not happen to be there but because it consists, in whole or in part, of elements too abstract for sensory representation".

In the most vivid of instances, from the perspective of hypotyposis and schematics, the Pearson/Shank *written* account – which already, as I have pointed out above, provides evidence of the possible operation of reconstitutable abstractions like ethos and attitude - can be viewed *both* in terms of the performative power of description

and representation, and in terms of the potential offered for a reader's inventive as well as institutionally-'authorised' (re-)constitutions. None of these *(re-)*constitutions can be appropriately identified, I should want to argue, through an anti-institutional or canon-deconstructive strategy, such as were typical, for a host of historically-specific reasons, of critical-theoretical writing in the later decades of the 20thC (although their antecedents were set in place much earlier in the century).

Such (re-)constitutions are worked, instead, within *institutional* and indeed *disciplinary setups* of academic writing and publication, or, in the cases of film and theatre, within the disciplinary setup of these modes of cultural practice. Not, in other words, at least at first remove, outside of or in confrontation with those disciplinary norms. The *interdisciplinary turn* must wait upon those initial constitutions, and cannot, besides, explain their operations. They seem to engage a reader or viewer or theatre spectator immediately in a number of instances of identification and amplification, worked through schematic and symbolic hypotyposis, specific to the discipline concerned.

To return to the text which has triggered these reflections, I want to conclude by noting that I am not only referring here, through my use of hypotyposis, to the sites and examples of Brith Gof's professional practice, or to aspects of the archaeological with which these are threaded. I am equally interested in the ways in which a sympathetic reader will conjure up a particular understanding of - for example - "interdisciplinarity" on the basis of such a textual 'sketch' as we find in that text. I am supposing that reading, in this sort of instance, does not simply entail 'decoding' what is taken to be 'already present' - as though 'it' were 'in the text'. Rather, it takes place in a curious site metaphorically *suspended* - providing a reader engages with it - somewhere between text, senses of self and person of writers, *and* of disciplinary domain or domains, which carry, in turn, their authorised ways of seeing and doing, as well as preferred interpretative apparatuses.

Once I engage, as reader, with the complex and unwieldy system I have attempted to sketch out above, I begin to fossick; to look actively for, recognize and identify, less

the agenda set out by the writers, than what I take to be disparate particles in the text, assembling these in terms of the recognisable *disciplinary* patterns which I similarly bring with me. Through my own recourse to ("externalist") elements - some of which, firstly, *cannot be written* other than through institutional and disciplinary metaphor; some of which, secondly, seem too abstract for a technically-precise written representation (e.g. Bourdieu's notion of a "theoretical disposition" is an abstraction; of "habitus"; of *the propensity for* certain sorts of judgements of taste and value) - I bring with me to the act a considerable range and order of things and abstractions - as might an "interpretive archaeologist" - which I nonetheless insist *should not be supposed to be either present in, or to have lent their orders to, what is ontologically present in the site itself.*

To the extent that what is involved in this event of deciphering and (re-) constitution is not present in the site itself, I am required to 'make-do', with the economical traces of the writers' own, solidly invested, institutionally-authorized disciplinary mastery. Now, if this is indeed the case, then the (re-)constitutions demanded by *Theatre/Archaeology* depend upon a writer's disciplinary mastery, a reader's disciplinary mastery, combined with the strategies and tactics of the postmodern *bricoleur*. How curious, then, that the interdisciplinary turn in Performance Studies is so often *not* made on the basis of pre-established performance professional mastery, or the explicit acknowledgement of it.

What needs to be observed, in more general terms, is that this writing encourages readers to constitute a felt-universe, in which good faith, excellent intention, authoritative positioning, writer-investment - and, indeed, *belief and commitment* - play quite particular roles. What might be *dramatic* about "interpretive archaeology", and about any such account of the past, is the difficulty presented to the specialist who is interested in abstractions, sensing, intuition, and judgements of taste and value, as well as material traces in sites. In *Theatre/Archaeology*, then, we can identify the 'figuration' of what will be (re-)constituted, by a reader, in terms of belief and investment, not just in the interdisciplinary turn, not just in cultural histories, not just in the need for creative dialogue across disciplinary and other borders. Each of these is explicitly thematized in the text itself. The evidence of belief which also attracts my interest is the writers' own

unthematized *belief in the efficacy of writing itself*, in certain expert, disciplinary registers (whether autobiographical, narrative, or critical-theoretical). The "weaving of connections through...indeterminate times and places" it undertakes *in/as/through writing* does not falter, because these writers are master-practitioners, each holding a senior position as professional writer-researcher-educator, in the university. Let's say so, recalling Osborne, above, on the "professional philosopher".

My own closing argument is that ~~Performance~~ (Spectator) Studies, in the university, has tended to avoid appropriate acknowledgement of the institutions and the persons of professional performance-making; and it has failed - because in the university it could not resource it - to be concerned with either the aesthetics of or training in the performance-making disciplines, which it has left to other institutions and organisations (patronised by that university, in more than one sense of the term).